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Abstract This paper extends existing analyses of self-insurance and self-protec-
tion—distinctions first made by Ehrlich and Becker (J Polit Econ 80:623–648, 1972)—
that countries may implement at a national level in pursuit of their security. We show
that, when no market insurance is available, self-insurance alone raises important new
issues as to the definition of “fair pricing” and as to the relations between pricing, opti-
mization, risk aversion, and inferiority that are significantly different from standard,
conventional market analysis. We also discover a hitherto unrecognized tendency for
misallocation between self-protection and self-insurance when both are available and
considered together. Because of external effects running from self-protection to self-
insurance, governments ruled by myopic bureaucracies and trying to find the right
balance face incentives that encourage extreme, self-inflicted moral hazard, to the
detriment of self-protection.
Keywords Self-insurance · Self-protection · Actuarially fair condition · Inferior
goods · Public goods
An earlier version of this paper was presented to a Conference on “The Causes and Consequences of
Conflict,” Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Germany, March 28–29, 2008, with proceedings in a
special issue of Economics of Governance. The authors thank Robin Boadway, Magnus Hoffman,
Kai Konrad, other conference participants, and this journal’s referee for insightful comments on earlier
versions.
T. Ihori (B)
Department of Economics, University of Tokyo, 113-0033 Hongo, Tokyo, Japan
e-mail: ihori@e.u-tokyo.ac.jp
M. C. McGuire
Department of Economics, University of California-Irvine, Irvine, CA 92697, USA
e-mail: mcmcguir@uci.edu
123
104 T. Ihori, M. C. McGuire
1 Introduction
Among the first to examine combinations of instruments open to individuals to manage
risks to their well-being were Ehrlich and Becker (“EB,” 1972). EB identified several
types of preparation available to expected utility maximizing individuals faced with
what we will call “costs of emergency.” These costs consist of any mix of (a) probabil-
ity of loss and (b) magnitude of loss (hereafter together referred to as “risk profile”).
Among such preparations were (a) “self insurance” to compensate for or reduce the
magnitude of loss (b) “self-protection” to reduce the probabilities of loss—neither of
which involved market choice or market insurance—and (c) insurance purchased from
others in a market.
It would now be generally agreed that these ideas apply to entire societies attempt-
ing to cope with diverse conflicts. Governments need not passively accept risks that
production and/or consumption decline in unwelcome situations. The EB distinctions
apply with respect to nations also (Ihori 1994). For them diverse instruments exist to
manage national adversity including self-insurance and self-protection. Most govern-
ments, at present, treat these two as essentially separate.1 But, as we show, separation
of security provision into self-protection and self-insurance is a bad idea. There needs
to be much more coordination between these two seemingly disparate functions of
government (see McGuire 2000, 2006; McGuire and Becker 2006).
Analysis of multiple instruments of collective risk management must extend the
standard market insurance paradigm in several respects. First, sovereign agents will
face increasing costs for self-insurance coverage in contrast to the competitive linear
prices relevant to individual market insurance. This feature of risk management at
the level of nations deserves more attention than usually accorded to it; diminishing
returns to self insurance require new approaches to the meaning and measurement
of actuarial fairness (as spelled out in the Appendix to this paper), and to identifica-
tion of risk neutral resource allocations for instance. Second, when instruments both
for self-insurance and for self-protection are available to a single decision maker,
reducing risks through protection changes the price of self-insurance and thus the two
allocations will interact in an unfamiliar manner. This essay will show that prominent
among these is a type of self inflicted moral hazard. Moreover, we must integrate into
such non-market situations known results concerning inferiority of market insurance
(Mossin 1968; Hoy and Robson 1981; Eeckoudt and Gollier 2000; Schlesinger 2000)
and of protection (Ihori and McGuire 2006, 2007, 2008a,b).
When an agent provides security by spending on commercial market insurance,
then a standard result states that with actuarially fair linear pricing, complete cover-
age (net of premiums) is purchased from resources available in the good contingency
(EB, Mossin 1968; Hirshleifer and Riley 1975). We compare this benchmark result
1 We agree with EB that distinctions between risk and magnitude of loss are in one sense artificial since
any countermeasure most likely will show alloyed improvements along both dimensions. Nevertheless gov-
ernments typically ignore the interactions among these components. For example, diplomatic or defense
policy striving to reduce chances of energy supply disruption may recognize strategic petroleum reserves
as a backstop for failure. But it would be extremely rare for the benefit from reducing the need/cost of
stockpiling to be counted in a defense planner’s estimate of how to value policy efforts on persuasion,
deterrence, bribery, or threat.
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with self-insurance by an entire country, and use it also to examine the effect of such
self-insurance on the choice of self-protection. This necessitates close attention to
fair pricing in a context of diminishing returns; and here we discover that here the
definition of actuarial fairness itself is ambiguous.
First we show that if the country provides of self insurance as a national public
good and if its spending on this self-insurance is subject to diminishing returns due to
decreasing productivity of insurance premiums, then (contrary to the standard market
result just mentioned) complete coverage (net of premiums) need not be purchased
from resources available in the good contingency, irrespective of the ambiguity of
fairness in pricing.
Next, we consider the incentives and conflicts facing a government that can both
insure and protect at the same time. We identify three effects of security expenditure:
(a) “insurance benefit” provided by the Government’s “insurance branch,” (b) “reduc-
tion of dispersion or variance of outcomes” by the Government’s “protection branch,”
(c) “insurance cost savings benefits” provided by the protection branch. These dis-
tinctions are central to our paper. We show for comparison that if self-insurance can
be provided at a market-like fair price, a country that fails to coordinate protection
and insurance will never self-protect at all. Failure to recognize the insurance benefits
generated by linear priced self-protection leads to its shutdown. Thus, we show that
the difficulties of extreme moral hazard can be self inflicted. The incentive to take
excessive risk is not due to a desire to pass costs on to a second party, but instead
to information deficits and mal-coordination by the providers of protection. In fact,
any agent, including entire governments, that is capable of both self-insurance and
self-protection but who being a price-taker is also unaware of the effects of protection
on the price of insurance will succumb to incentives similar to moral hazard.
We then apply the same idea when insurance is provided by a large agent, say
the size of an entire nation, where such self insurance is usually characterized by the
decreasing returns. Here, we argue, nations will have access to actuarially fair returns
to their insurance outlays. And we show that diminishing productivity of insurance
together with actuarial fairness in returns in no way resolves the self-inflicted moral
hazard problem.
Our arguments conclude that unless properly coordinated, self-insurance will drive
out self-protection completely. This implies that there is far too little consideration
given to measures that will improve the odds against war, catastrophe etc (not par-
ticularly military measures, all measures). Our arguments lead to the implication that
too much attention tends to be given to insurance-type effort and too little to risk
improving effort.
This paper consists of four sections. First, we formulate a basic analytical frame-
work. Then Sect. 2 reviews characteristics of optimization under market insurance,
self-insurance, and alternatively self-protection for a single country. Section 3 consid-
ers interaction between self-insurance and self-protection. Finally Sect. 4 concludes.
2 Analytical framework for a single agent
Let us begin with a narrative to illustrate the concept that our models will try to
capture or summarize. Imagine there is an island nation that is subject to flooding.
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Whenever a flood happens there is a big loss. No matter how big the flood, the loss
is the same, L. To protect itself against this loss the country can reduce the frequency
of flooding by building flood-barriers, dikes, channels etc. If it builds no dikes a flood
happens every other year. If it builds dikes that are 6 feet tall, the country will be
flooded every 6 years. If this country builds dikes 15 feet tall it will be flooded every
11 years. The frequency of flooding depends on the height of its flood barriers. The
relationship between cost of dikes and frequency of flood (1 − p) will be known with
certainty.2
To prepare for this loss, the country can also stockpile food and other necessities.
Ignore time discounting and assume to start a linear relationship such that that if a
flood happens every other year, each year without a flood the country can set aside x
pounds of goods for the next year when there is a flood and have available in that year
x pound of goods. If a flood happens every 6 years then to have x pounds available
during the flood, the country only needs to give up x/5 lbs during each of the 5 dry
years. If a flood happens every 11 years the country can provide x lbs during the
flood by giving up only x/10 lb in each of the dry years. In other words, as an initial
assumption suppose the country can self-insure at an actuarially fair price, (1− p)/p,
irrespective of the scale of provision, “x.”
2.1 Risk profiles and emergency cost
Congruent with the foregoing story we consider a single agent and two contingent
states, a good state “1” and a bad state, “0”. Ignoring all insurance and compensation
possibilities (that is taking L as a fixed parameter) expected utility for this agent is
given as:
W = pU 1(Y ) + (1 − p)U 0(Y − L)
C1 = Y ; C0 = Y − L (1)
or W = W (Y, p) (2)
where W is expected utility, C is consumption, L is loss in the bad state, and p is
the chance of a good state. Our analysis will focus on the two canonical types of
Ehrlich-Becker (EB) defense; (i) EB’s “self-protection;” which raises p and reduces
(1 − p), (ii) EB’s “self-insurance” which reduces L . Aside from our flood narrative,
the variable “p” might be risk of trade interruption, disease outbreak, environmental
calamity, or war. Utility function U () is assumed to be the same whether luck is good
or bad. U 1 denotes realized utility if the good event happens, and U 0 if the bad event
happens, and UY ≡ ∂U/∂Y > 0, UY Y ≡ ∂2U/∂Y 2 < 0.
To establish the incentives for a single agent Eq. (3) shows the individual budget
constraint: where Y is a fixed income and mk denotes allocations (k = 1, 2) to risk
2 Let “d” be the number of dry years and “w” the number of wet years. Then p = d/(w + d) gives the
frequency of dry years or of success, and (1 − p) give the frequency of wet years or of failure.
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reduction, p (m1), and or loss reduction −L (m2)—here
Y = C + mk (3)
considered a variable of choice. Therefore, if our concern is with insurance only—with
−L a variable but p taken to be a parameter—Eq. (1) can be written
W˜ = W˜ (Y, mk). (4)
Equation (4) then shows it can be natural and helpful to consider m rather than L to
be the national security public good.
2.2 Market insurance: standard result
We will emphasize presently how the structure and context of self-insurance for a large
entity such as an entire nation is inherently quite different from market insurance. So it
is for later comparative purposes useful to set out in brief summary the standard market
insurance model, where again m2 represents quantity of coverage in bad times.
A basic feature of the standard market insurance model (which distinguishes it from
self-insurance) is that the cost of insurance coverage in bad times is linear. For a linear
insurance recovery function instead of −L (m2) we write (with numeraire income
being consumption in good times):
C1 = Y − m1 − πm2 (5)
and
C0 = Y − m1 − (L − m2) (6)
where πm2 gives the expenditure on market insurance in good times (measured in
units of C1), and m2 represents the amount of insurance coverage purchased at price
π . Entered as a parameter, m1 gives the allocation to risk improving self-protection.
Then welfare becomes3
W = p(m1)U 1 [Y − m1 − πm2] + (1 − p(m1))U 0
[
Y − m1 − (L − m2)
]
. (7)
Then for optimal insurance, maximizing Eq. (7) (or equivalently Eq. (8) from the foot-
note) with respect to m2 yields necessary condition Eq. (9).
− pπU 1Y + (1 − p)U 0Y = 0 (9)
3 If instead we took m2/π to mean the amount of coverage and m2 contingency-1 expenditures, we would
write W = p(m1)U1 [Y − m1 − m2] + (1 − p(m1))U0
[
Y − m1 −
(
L − m2π
)] (8). Equations (7) and
(8) are equivalent in the standard linear case, but we will favor Eq. (7) as more conventional. But in the non-
linear case Eqs. (7) and (8) differ importantly, since each implies a different measure of actuarial fairness
and risk neutral allocation—issues treated briefly in the Appendix and deserving of further analysis.
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If the price of insurance happens to be actuarially fair as in Eq. (10) then the FOC
would entail U 1Y = U 0Y whence
Actuarial fair price: π = (1 − p)/p (10)
U 1 = U 0 and, therefore, C1 = C0 or Y − m1 − πm2 = Y − m1 − (L − m2). And
from this it follows that at the optimum, insurance coverage purchased is
m2 = pL (11)
so that the total cost of such fairly priced insurance at the optimum becomes
πm2 = (1 − p)L (12)
This standard result states that with fair linear pricing, complete coverage (net of pre-
miums) is purchased. We will use this market insurance summary as the benchmark
for later to comparison with self-insurance by an entire country, and also in exam-
ination of the effect of insurance on the choice of protection. m2 is independent of
income; the income effect is zero.
2.3 Self insurance
Self-insurance provided to itself by a large entity such as a nation differs in two impor-
tant respects from standard market insurance. To show this, we alter notation slightly.
Rather than −L(m) where L(0) was a threatened loss if nothing is spent on insurance,
we write
− L(m) = −[L − L(m)] (13)
Now the entire, total, insurance benefit is shown by l, and L(0) is given by L .
2.3.1 Diminishing returns
First of all, self-insurance differs from standard market insurance in that self-insur-
ance function l should show diminishing returns or increasing costs. l′ > 0, l′′ < 0.
EB make this assumption also, and refer glancingly to the role of human capital in
providing for self-insurance as a source of diminishing returns. We believe (i) that
scale considerations appropriate for an entire country along an extensive margin as
well as (ii) other cooperating factors of production, as in EB, argue that “self-insur-
ance” has such declining marginal productivity. National self-insurance may often
involve actions like stockpiling or standby production maintenance and these surely
will show diminishing returns.4 If m2 is very productive, −L may even conceivably
4 In our story of flood protection and insurance, as greater quantities of consumables are set aside during dry
years, their costs of preservation and delivery during good years might increase more than proportionately.
For example, as an extreme case, if p = 1/2 setting aside m2 = 1 provides 1 unit in bad times, but saving
m2 = 8 yields only 4 units in bad times, etc. Here l = (m2)2/3.
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be negative for high values of m2 (recognized also by EB as “negative insurance” or as
termed here, “gambling.”), so that over some region −L(m2) = −[L − L(m2)] > 0.
However, we ignore this case as it implies a reversal between good and bad contingen-
cies. Declining “productivity” of “m2” thus is the first source of a distinction between
sovereign self-insurance vs. lesser scale decentralized market insurance.5
Such diminishing returns also will introduce new issues in the formulation of inter-
contingency pricing of self-insurance that are absent from market insurance—a fact
not recognized in the literature as far as we can tell—new issues that imply further
hitherto unrecognized interactions between the form of pricing and the structure of the
optimum. Quite arguably, the self-insurance function should be written more gener-
ally as L(m2, p, π) to allow for still more complicated interactions between insurance,
risk, and price. This would cause the definitions and formulation of “actuarial fairness”
become ambiguous. But we relegate these complications to the appendix and concen-
trate here on the most salient formulation of pricing when insurance is non-linear with
inter-contingency price π as shown in Eq. (14):
W = pU 1 [Y − πm2] + (1 − p)U 0
[
Y − {L − L(m2)}
] : m1 not shown (14)
where π shows the actuarial price per unit in good times necessary to yield m2 units
of resources in adversity.
2.3.2 Salience of fair pricing
Complications like writing L = L(m2, p, π) aside, a second major difference between
self-insurance as provided by an entire country and ordinary market insurance is that
when a whole nation provides insurance to itself, fair pricing would seem to be the
standard case and not an outlier just referenced for comparison. Of course nation’s
can make mistakes, have imperfect information etc. But countries in this position are
“bargaining with themselves” as to how much insurance and at what price to provide
it. They should not in principle have to worry about adverse selection or moral hazard.
So they should not give themselves deductibles, “load” prices nor impose arbitrary
insurance limits to control fraud.6 Moreover, it is plausible to assume that the nation
as a price maker, not as a price taker, incorporates this actuarially fair condition at its
optimization.
2.3.3 The insurance optimization problem
Now similar to EB’s derivation, expected utility Eq. (14) is maximized with respect
to m2. This gives Eq. (15) as the first order condition. Equation (15) shows the marginal
5 EB state in passing that self-insurance is independent of risk, but this is surely a mistake. Stockpiling for
a seven year recurring famine is surely more expensive than for one that comes every 25 years.
6 Of course countries have corruption, rent seeking, and numerous misalignments of incentives to concern
them.
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cost of providing l,





, equal to the marginal benefit of providing l, i.e. (1 − p)U 0Y L′, evaluated
at the solution value of m2 If this necessary condition is rewritten as in Eq. (16) then
its actuarial meaning becomes clear. The RHS there gives the probability weighted
marginal insurance -benefit receipt under adversity while the LHS gives marginal cost
of one unit of insurance for the last dollar of premium paid in good times.
U 1Y /U
0
Y = [(1 − p)/pπ ]L′(m2) (16)
2.3.4 Definitions of “Actuarial Fairness”
If self-insurance is actuarially fair (henceforth simply “fair”) as we believe should
be the paradigm for an entire country then the concept must be defined. An obvious
parallel to the fairness under linear market insurance is resource allocation fairness as
in Eq. (10) which is the same as Eq. (17).
Resource allocation fairness: π = (1 − p)/p. (17)
An alternative definition of actuarial fairness would incorporate the marginal pro-
ductivity of resources as applied to the bad contingency. This we label “marginal
productivity fairness,” as defined by Eq. (18):
Marginal productivity fairness: π = L′(1 − p)/p (18)
2.3.4.1 Optimal solution allocations
If fairness under marginal productivity—Eq. (18)— obtains then at the optimum
U 0Y /U
1
Y = 1 and thus U 1Y = U 0Y ; U 1 = U 0; Y 1 = Y 0 so that the optimum requires
complete coverage and the analysis of inferior goods proceeds just as in the linear
case. Although this definition of actuarial fairness leads to a nice symmetry it assumes
that the self-insuring agent somehow knows its optimal purchase of insurance “in
advance,” so as to have knowledge of l′ before actually making its allocations. But
this seems implausible. Moreover, under Eq. (18) one could not tell whether insur-
ance was fairly priced until the optimum was actually chosen. This supports the first,
more conventional, and we believe preferable, definition of actuarial fairness. Under
fairness by that first definition Eq. (17) then the optimum simplifies to
U 1Y /U
0
Y = L′(m2) (19)
Equation (19) is simply a familiar equality of MRS and Marginal Rate of Transfor-
mation, which obtains irrespective of risks (1 − p) so long as the price of insurance is
fair. But note, in contrast to the linear market insurance case no equivalence is implied
between U 1Y and U 0Y .
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These distinctions between “resource allocation fairness” and “marginal produc-
tivity fairness” in the pricing of insurance are analyzed in depth in the companion
paper to this (Ihori and McGuire 2008b). For the remainder of this paper we focus on
“resource allocation farness” as characterized by Eq. (10) or (17).
2.4 Self protection
Now to return to our flood protection anecdote we suppose a country can reduce the
frequency of flooding by building flood-barriers, dikes, channels etc. (See Cornes
1993). The frequency of flooding depends on the height of the flood barriers, and the
relationship between cost of dikes and frequency of flood is known with certainty i.e.
(1− p) in our model. Thus the second risk management instrument to consider is self-
protection with m1 spent to reduce the chance of a bad event, 1 − p, i.e. to decrease
what we call “baseline risk7 of [1 − p(0)].” Ihori and McGuire (2007) demonstrated
(with insurance fixed parametrically as similarly developed in McGuire et al. (1991))
that for self-protection the issue of normality-inferiority is substantially more involved
than it has proven to be for self-insurance as analyzed here. We now desire to extend
the Ihori-McGuire analysis of self-protection developed for the special case of fixed
uninsured loss to the more general case of (1) variable loss and (2) self-insurance where
(3) insurance benefit is non-linear, and (4) actuarial fairness interacts with diminishing
returns. Whatever the risk-reduction/self- protection function, p (m1) , p′ > 0, and
p′′ < 0 are assumed throughout.8
To begin, we repeat Eq. (14) now including both variables m1 and m2. Inserting the
condition for resource actuarial fairness, π = [(1 − p) /p] directly gives:
W = p(m1)U 1
[
Y − m1 − 1 − p(m1)p(m1) m2
]
+ (1 − p(m1))U 0
[
Y − m1 − {L − L(m2)}
] (14)
The FOC for determining optimal expenditure on self-protection becomes:
[











We can characterize this optimality condition in the provision of self protection saying
that there are “direct” marginal benefits in the form of the gain in utility p′
(
U 1 − U 0),
“direct” marginal costs
[
pU 1Y + (1 − p) U 0Y
]
and “indirect” benefits, p′m2U 1Y /p,
7 Our “baseline risk” corresponds to what is sometimes referred to as “background risk” in economics of
insurance analyses. Background risk distinguishes “independent” background risk where p(0) is not influ-
enced by the value of L(0) as in our model here, versus “non-independent” background risk where p(0) and
L(0) are interdependent, and asks how the choice of protection or insurance varies with the independence
property (See Schlesinger 2000).
8 Where useful we can re-write Eqs. (2) as (20) where L, m2, and l are now taken to be parameters.
Differences in functions W˜i (·) and

W i (·) are implicit in each model, so the notational distinction will be
omitted henceforth

W = W (C, m1) (20).
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comprised of, an unambiguous gain from the decrease in insurance premiums paid for
the same m2 coverage received stemming from the lower price implied by lower risk
(1 − p). Note that since the sole variable of choice here is m1 any possible implica-
tions of the change in p (m1) on subsequent choices of m2 and, therefore, of insurance
purchased (by the agent choosing insurance) are irrelevant.
SOC E = p′′(U 1 − U 0) − 2p′(U 1Y − U 0Y ) +
[
pU 1Y Y + (1 − p)U 0Y Y
]











(pp′′ − p′ p′) < 0 (22)
3 Interaction between self-protection and self-insurance
How will and how should a country’s insurance and protection programs be affected
by or influence one another? Do they complement or substitute for each other, com-
pete or mutually reinforce? How does the availability and utilization of information
among programs for protection versus insurance influence these relationships? These
questions seem to have received little attention.
Before addressing the larger question, however, we analyze a special case to illus-
trate the crucial importance of information availability and accuracy. This is the case
where the information and decision processes of the self-insuring/self-protecting agent
are independent and isolated from each other. We demonstrate that under such restric-
tions, especially when insurance is actuarially fair, moral hazard behavior will drive
provision of self-protection to zero. In particular we show this to be the case when
returns to self-insurance are constant and linear, as would be the case with perfect and
competitive market insurance.
3.1 A special example: linear fair market insurance (LFI)
As a benchmark case then, consider linear constant unit cost insurance as in a market
where a small agent takes the price of insurance as fixed. As before, for expected
welfare write:
W = p(m1)U 1 [Y − m1 − πm2]
+ (1 − p(m1))U 0
[
Y − m1 − (L − m2)
] (7)
where m2 and m1 and π are as previously defined.
3.1.1 Complete information utilized by the protection branch
Here we assume that the agent who provides insurance does not take the price of
insurance π as fixed, but rather incorporates the actuarial fair price condition Eq. (10)
into his optimization. The standard result for a single coordinated and fully informed
agent takes welfare the same as Eq. (7). Fair pricing, optimal self-insurance, and max-
imization with respect to m2 as in Eq. (11) gives the optimum m2 coverage purchased
123
National self-insurance and self-protection against adversity 113
as m2 = pL . Thus complete coverage is purchased net of premium cost. Next, assume
self-protection p (m1) can also be improved, so fair insurance price declines since risk
declines with the increase in p. How much will be spent on protection?
The answer in this standard case depends, on whether a self-protection provider
is aware that protection improves the price of insurance. Assume full information—
an alternative to the compartmentalized and unshared assumption of the next sub-
section—for an entity such as a nation that “bargains with itself” over the price of
insurance. The protection branch knows that an increases in m1 will lower the price of
insurance, π , by raising p and also knows this should affect the optimizing behavior of
the insurance branch. In a sense, the protection branch is above the insurance branch
in a hierarchy. We could suppose that the protection branch moves first, anticipating
that its provision of lower risk saves insurance costs but having no knowledge whether
the lower premium price it causes will stimulate or curtail the quantity of insurance.
Then, the insurance branch moves second.9 We begin with the necessary condition,
differentiating Eq. (7) with respect m1.
p′(U 1 − U 0) −
[














Then using the fact that pricing is fair after including U 1Y = U 0Y = UY Eq. (23)
simplifies to
p′[U 1 − U 0] − [pUY + (1 − p)UY ] + m2(p′/p)UY
−[{πpUY − (1 − p)UY } (dm1/m2)] = 0 (24)
When price is fair the final bracketed term vanishes at the optimum for insurance;
therefore, the “protection branch” can ignore this effect (i.e. ignore dm2/dm1) with-
out undermining the overall optimum, since the effect vanishes when the insurance
branch is doing its job properly. But Eq. (24) also includes m2(p′/p)U 1Y to indicate
that because of the cost savings that m1 generates for insurance, the optimal value
of m1 depends on the choice of m2 even at that stationary optimum for m2. So the
decision of how much to protect, to be optimal, must include a part of the effect
of protection on the price of insurance, namely the “insurance cost savings” effect.
The “insurance branch,” controlling only m2 will not recognize this effect attributable
to m1; the protection branch must recognize it. In this extended sense, the protection
branch is the “leader,” and the insurance branch is the “follower.” If the protection
branch fails to recognize it then as shown in the next sub-section the FOC-implement-
ing choices of insurance and protection agents will become incompatible, and m1 will
9 For individual protection and insurance, a hierarchal separation between protection and insurance deci-
sions sounds implausible. The smoker anticipates lower life insurance rates when he quits smoking.
He may think of buying more insurance at the lower rates as well. But to impute this sort of foresight
to a government however is not at all obvious. Thus our “complete information” case might be regarded as
ideal, even utopian.
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be driven to zero. But if this effect of m1 is recognized by the protection branch then
from m2 = pL and U 1 = U 0, at the overall optimum the optimal values of m1 and
m2 imply
p′ = 1/L (25)
So one of the benefits of spending to raise p when risk is already completely covered
by insurance (and will continue to be so covered after p and therefore π improves)
derives from the decrease in the cost of the optimal amount of insurance coverage
when the implied actuarially fair premium declines.10 In this case both m1 and m2 are
independent of income; the income effect is zero.
3.1.2 Effect of imperfect information: no information sharing between insurance and
protection providers
Now consider the protection branch of the country to be a price taker as the bench-
mark case as in a small open world. We investigate the outcome of non-cooperative
Nash equilibrium in such a world by exploring the incentives of the protection agent
if it ignores the cost savings it generates for providers of insurance. Here, although it
may recognize that p determines π , assume, nevertheless, the protection branch takes
π as a fixed parameter for its optimization problem and focuses solely on its role
in improving the weights on good and bad outcomes in the expected utility balance.
From the insurance provider’s choice of m2 at his optimum, maximization of Eq. (7)
with respect to m2 yields as
∂W
∂m2
≡ T (m2) = −pπU 1Y + (1 − p)U 0Y . (26)
Again crucially, assume that although m1 determines p(m1), and p determines π , and
π determines the cost of insurance coverage m2, nevertheless, the agent choosing m1
is ignorant of these relationships and overlooks the benefit that m1 creates by lowering
the cost of existing insurance. That is, assuming that the agent who provides m1 regards
the price of insurance π as fixed (despite the fact that because of that agent’s decisions
this price continually adjusts to satisfy the assumption of actuarial fairness). Then for
this case—which might describe behavior among government agencies that is myopic
and uncoordinated even though they share the same overall objective function—the
protection provider’s welfare maximization is given as:
dW
dm1
≡ T (m1) = p′(U 1 − U 2) − (pU 1Y + (1 − p)U 0Y ) (27)
10 We could have reached the same conclusion more directly by observing that since optimal insurance
when fairly priced equalizes income as between contingencies, the optimal value of m1 must be that which
maximizes this insured income, or minimizes
{−m1 − (1 − p(m1))L
}
. This must be the value of m1 such
that p′ = 1/L .
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Fig. 1 Uncoordinated nash behavior of insurance and protection agencies
Now, go back to the provider of insurance and suppose T (m2) = 0. Then, from
Eq. (26) plus an actuarially fair condition, [(1 − p) /p] = π we know U 0Y = U 1Y ;
hence U 0 = U 1. Substituting this into Eq. (27), gives T (m1) = −U 1Y < 0. Thus, when
Eq. (26) and the actuarially fair condition Eq. (10) both obtain, it follows T (m1) =
−U 1Y < 0. Next considering the provider of self-protection again let T (m1) = 0. Then
from Eq. (26) we know p′(U 1 −U 0) = [pU 1Y + (1− p)U 0Y ] > 0 and hence U 1 > U 0.
And this implies T (m2) = −pU 1Y + pU 0Y > 0.
To interpret this define curve T (m1) = 0 as the locus of (m1, m2) which satisfies
T (m1) = p′
(
U 1 − U 0) − [pU 1Y + (1 − p)U 0Y
]
= 0; and define curve T (m2) = 0
as the locus of (m1, m2) which satisfies T (m2) = −pU 1Y + pU 0Y = 0. Then to
summarize:
If T (m2) = 0, then T (m1) < 0 (28)
If T (m1) = 0, then T (m2) > 0 (29)
We can never find values along Eq. (28) = 0 for which Eq. (29) = 0, since whenever
Eq. (24) = 0, then Eq. (28) < 0. Therefore, at every point along the optimal insur-
ance curve Eq. (28) = 0, the agent providing protection wants to reduce m1 and thus
increase risk. If he could increase risk so much that p < 0 and (1 − p) > 1, and be
compensated for this increase by negative m1, the agent will want to do this. This is
moral hazard in the extreme.
On the other hand, everywhere along the curve T (m1) = 0, we see that dW/dm2 >
0, meaning that an insurance agent would want to insure more at each value of m1.
Thus it seems—in stark contrast to the incentives for a unitary government agent who
coordinates provision of (m1, m2)—that a decentralized security agencies would not
provide both types of security at the same time. Rather they would normally provide
m2 > 0 only. The two reaction curves T (m1) and T (m2) in space m1 − m2 with a
Nash solution at m1 = 0, m2 > 0 are shown in Fig. 1, where the closed contours are
loci of constant “security.”
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3.1.3 Need for inter-program information sharing
Bureaucratic compartmentalization like this seems to us entirely plausible, and not
diminished by the assumption that fair pricing is applicable and available. The demands
for inter bureau information exchange to achieve a first best optimum are significant,
since country wide benefits from m1 must be calculated to include cost savings in insur-
ance “premiums” that increases in m1 entail. That is the provider of protection must
include insurance cost-savings benefits in his calculations to select the correct value
of m1. This exercise emphasizes the daunting information requirements necessary for
the standard result.
3.2 General case: self insurance and self protection
According to the story in our introductory narrative the island nation subject to flood-
ing, can reduce its frequency by building flood-barriers, dikes, channels etc. and can
reduce the magnitude of loss by stockpiles, say of food and other necessities, self-
insuring at an actuarially fair price, π = (1 − p) /p. Here we dwell more generally
on how these two instruments interact with each other. In particular we show how the
effectiveness of insurance plus protection varies crucially with the quality of informa-
tion shared within the government and of cooperation among insurance and protection
measures, programs, or bureaus.
Since agents individually or in a group may spend on both insurance and pro-
tection, we are interested in how any one agent’s incentives interact with respect
to the two instruments when both are available. Specifically, taking fair insurance to
be the norm, we focus on how anticipation that expenditure on p will affect π influ-
ences the optimal choice of m1 and therefore of p(m1). First, suppose the government
knows all these relationships. It knows the effect of dike height and cost on frequency,
and knows it can self-insure at fair prices.
To begin we repeat Eq. (14) now including both variables m1 and m2, inserting the
condition for actuarial fairness, π = [(1 − p) /p] directly, and writing W in the form
where m2 indicates quantity of insurance coverage purchased while πm2 represents
total expenditure on insurance coverage :
W = p(m1)U 1
[
Y − m1 − m2{1 − p(m1)}p(m1)
]
+ (1 − p(m1))U 0
[
Y − m1 − {L − L(m2)}
] (14)
As derived in above,—assuming that the insurance branch accepts m1 as a parame-
ter and thus disregards any anticipated change in p(m1) and therefore in π—the FOC
with respect to m2 gives
S = −U 1Y
[




Y − m1 − {L − L(m2)}
] = 0 (30)
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The FOC for determining optimal expenditure on self-protection m1 becomes:
[


















As in the case of linear insurance, at the optimum value m2, the bracketed term
which includes dm2/dm1 vanishes, such that in a properly decentralized organiza-
tion of (m1, m2) the “protection branch” can ignore it. However we cannot ignore
the effects of protection on the price of insurance, so that the third bracketed term in
Eq. (31) must be incorporated in the protection branch calculus 11.
3.2.1 Organization and information sharing between protection and insurance
branches
We can consolidate our argument for information sharing among government branches
if we think of implementation as solving these two equations:
∂W/∂m1 = φ1(m1, m2) = 0 :⇒ m1 = f 1(m2) (32a)
and
∂W/∂m2 = φ2(m1, m2) = 0 :⇒, m2 = f 2(m1) (32b)
To illustrate the solution draw the “reaction” curves f 2(m1) = m2 and f 1(m2) = m1
over contours of “constant security” as in Fig. 2. At their intersection we would have
the true optimal values of m∗1 and m∗2.
To see the effects of compartmentalization, suppose, rather than a unitary decision
maker, an insurance branch within the government and a protection branch are each
charged with providing m2 and m1 respectively. If we assume full information shar-
ing then that government would understand its welfare to be as shown in Eqs. (32a,
32b) and would strive to implement m∗1 and m∗2. How could it do that? Here are some
approaches.









U1Y Y π+U0Y L′′+U0Y Y (L ′)2
]
≥
< 0 (33). By SOCs for
Eq. (30) the denominator of Eq. (33) is negative. As a special case, if L′ = 1 at the insurance optimum
of Eq. (30) so that U1 = U0; U1Y = U0Y ; U1Y Y = U0Y Y then the sign of Eq. (33) is > 0 so that just as
in the linear insurance case, quantity of coverage m2 and of protection are gross complements. We can
also simplify Eq. (33) using the definition R = −UY Y /UY , where R is the coefficient of risk aversion.
Then dm2/dm1 = −
[




/[(−)] (34). Then, under constant risk
aversion, from the FOC the first two terms of the numerator cancel so that increases in expenditures on
protection raise optimized quantity of self insurance coverage that is dm2/dm1 > 0 and we know in this
case m2 is a borderline normal good. Moreover, even if risk aversion is declining so that R1 < R0 still m2
may be gross complements since only a very great value of R0 will offset the positive weight of the final
term in the numerator.
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Fig. 2 Full-information nash behavior of insurance and protection agencies
3.2.2 Bureaucratic coordination
A. Black box approach: Just assume that the government makes all the calculations,
derives the answer and instructs the insurance branch to spend m∗2 and the pro-
tection branch to spend m∗1. This approach avoids the governance problem of
externalities as between protection and insurance branches by assuming it away.
B. Central control plus decentralized execution: The government informs each
branch of its correct reaction function m1 = f 1(m2) and m2 = f 2(m1).
(Note that the first of these incorporates the effect of m1 on π and the insurance-
cost-savings attributable to protection outlays). From any point in Fig. 2, each
branch moves toward its correct reaction function in Cournot fashion, until the
intersection optimum of m∗1 and m∗2 is reached.
C. Hierarchical execution. The government entrusts one branch to make a final “all
at once decision.” This avoids the zig-zag iteration implied by B. Instead, the
government gives the function m2 = f 2(m1) to the protection branch or the func-
tion m1 = f 1(m2) to the insurance branch. The “Leader-branch” that receives
the reaction function then implements it and solves for the overall optimum and
provides to the “Follower branch” its solution value of mL (“L” for leader) after
which the “Follower-branch” just follows its reaction function, providing mF as
anticipated by the leader.
To sum up, if a large agent the size of a nation, may spend on both insurance and
protection, we expect that both m1 and m2 should (if information is shared and coordi-
nated) be provided at an interior solution. But if information is not correctly distributed
and recognized—specifically, if the insurance cost savings from improvements in self
protection are not allowed to influence those self-protection decisions—then in aggre-
gate decisions will be suboptimal with losses from extreme moral hazard and corner
solutions where only m2 is provided, just like the benchmark case of market insurance
in a small open price taking economy. Note that if we ignore the third term in Eq. (31),
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the sign of Eq. (31) is likely to become negative. For example, if l′ ≥ 1, the sign of
Eq. (31) becomes negative and we have the extreme moral hazard and corner solutions.
4 Conclusion
This paper has investigated two types of preparation available to expected utility
maximizing agents faced with “costs of emergency”, namely self-insurance and
self-protection. Self-insurance provided to itself by a large entity such as a nation
differs in two important respects from standard market insurance. First of all, the
self-insurance function should show diminishing returns or increasing costs whereas
market insurance typically has linear or piecewise linear pricing. Second, self-insuring
countries far more readily than individuals should have access to actuarially fair prices,
which they can then incorporate into their optimization.
If a small price taking agent provides insurance at a market price, then the standard
result holds that with pricing fair and linear, complete coverage (net of premiums) is
purchased. We have used this standard result as a benchmark to compare with self-
insurance by an entire country, and also in our examination of the effect of insurance
on the choice of protection.
First, we show that the effect of decreasing productivity (ordinary diminishing
returns) when a nation provides self insurance is for complete coverage (net of pre-
miums) not to be purchased except by unlikely chance.
Second we describe the incentive structure when both types of protection are avail-
able. In doing this we have focused on the mis-incentives that follow when providers
of protection and of insurance (within the same government) ignore the benefits and
cost they confer on each other. More specifically, we show that without recognition
of such external benefits and costs, the security providers of a country are likely to
drive themselves into a corner, in effect, of extreme moral hazard where insurance is
over-provided and protection abandoned. Thus, an agent trying to provide both self-
insurance and self-protection may find that both will never be provided at the same
time because of ignorance of the insurance cost savings attributable to protection out-
lays. The resolution of this mis-incentive requires that the providers of risk-reducing
protection recognize in their calculus the cost-savings they provide to insurers. Since
improvements in protection lower the actuarially fair price available to self-insuring
agents, the decision of how much protection to provide must incorporate this benefit.
Once such benefit is recognized and included in the calculus of protection, the moral
hazard corner will be avoided.
Thus, we have shown that separation of security decision-making into self-protec-
tion and self-insurance is a bad idea. In fact most governments, at present, treat them
as essentially separate. There needs to be much more coordination between these
two seemingly disparate functions of government. Also, our arguments conclude that
unless properly coordinated, self-insurance will push out self-protection completely,
driving m1 to zero in our terminology. This says that there is far too little consider-
ation given to measures that will improve the odds against war, catastrophe etc (not
particularly military measures, all measures). Our arguments lead to the implication
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that too much attention tends to be given to insurance provision and too little to risk
improvement.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Noncom-
mercial License which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium,
provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
Appendix
The concept and measurement of actuarially fair pricing is crucial as a benchmark
throughout the analysis of insurance. This appendix dwells briefly on an ambiguity
in definition of actuarial fairness that arises when insurance is self-provided with
diminishing returns.
The paper’s main text assumes one simple relationship between premiums paid,
πm2, during good times and l(m2) benefits received during bad times, where the
variable of choice is units of coverage m2. As pointed out in footnote 3, we could
cast the problem in terms of units of expenditure (where we define x2 = πm2, “x”
for”expenses,” and where m2 = x2/π) such that the variable of choice is x. Here
1/π would indicate the efficiency of resource transfer across contingencies. But that
suggests that in place of Eq. 14 we could write either Eq. (14a) or (14b):
W = pU 1 [Y − πm2]
+ (1 − p)U 0[Y − {L − L(m2)}] : m1 not shown (14)
W = pU 1[Y − x2] + (1 − p)U 0[Y − {L − L(x2/π)}] : m1 not shown (14a)








: m1 not shown. (14b)
When transfer of resources across contingencies is written as in Eq. (14a) it becomes
obvious on inspection that every unit of x2 may not transfer into just exactly x2/π
units to the bad contingency. Once this is recognized then the idea of “fair” pricing
becomes ambiguous.
In Eq. (14b) 1/π indicates not the productivity or accumulation of x2-resources but
the accumulation in bad times of l units of benefit. Now, in a sense, the l-function
operates during good times to create transfers available only under adversity; so that
for the total l/π received in adversity, x2 was set aside in the good contingency.12
12 One way to think about this is to assume there is a steady state. We can then frame self-insurance in
terms of changes in, or alternative parameters for this steady state. Normalizing the notation of note 1, let
w = 1, d = n., Here is the steady state. Every n + 1 years there is a crisis, requiring that the self-insurance
accumulation be utilized. Each year from 1 to n, $m2 is set aside in anticipation of year n + 1. That is
“self-insurance” is fair. At year n +2 the process starts over again, and on and on. Therefore p = n/[n +1],
and (1 − p)=1/[n + 1]. π = 1/n so that m2/π = nm2. Changes in the risk of adversity then are given by
changes in n. If n is large adversity happens only rarely so that (1 − p) is small, and if n is small, the risk
of adversity (1 − p) is high. We ignore discounting, and uncertainty.
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When insurance is supplied in the market and its marginal costs and benefit are
linear, this distinction between Eqs. (14a) and (14b) does not arise or it doesn’t matter;
but when l displays diminishing returns how to describe the cost of insurance seems
to be ambiguous. Do diminishing returns apply both to quantities reserved and to the
lapse of time between adversities, or only to the former? Between Eqs. (14a) and (14b),
the difference seems to lie in “when” the resources transferred across contingencies
become productive—before (as in Eq. (14b)) or after (as in Eq. (14a)) the transfer.
The novelty of this distinction, or the fact that it seems to have been overlooked, may
be because when the insurance function is linear, as in market insurance, no such
difference arises.
For either of these options Eq. (14a) or (14b) the idea of actuarial fairness is still
important, but its implications with respect to outcomes vary. For example, if mar-
ginal utilities just happened to be equalized at the optimum such that l′ = 1 then
consumption would also be equalized. It turns out that this would imply L(m2) =
(1 − p)L , in the case of Eq. (14b) or L(x2/π) = (1 − p)L in the case of Eq. (14a).
Although symmetric to market insurance neither of these conditions is required to
obtain even when coverage is fairly priced—not required because there is no necessity
that l′ = 1. In either case FOCs inform us of optimal protection and allow comparison
Eqs. (14a) and (14b), assuming self-insurance to be fairly priced. Generally optimal
provision may be greater under formulation Eq. (14a) or (14b) depending on the man-
ner in which p, (1 − p) influence MRS and MRT in each formulation. Moreover
the benefit in the bad contingency might depend in a more complicated manner on
resources set aside in good times than either Eq. (14a) or (14b). Then we would want
to write L = L(π, p, x2) and the definition of fair insurance correspondingly more
ambiguous.
References
Cornes R (1993) Dyke maintenance and other stories: some neglected types of public goods. J Public Econ,
MIT Press 108(1): 259–271
Eeckoudt L, Gollier C (2000) The effects of changes in risk on risk taking: a survey, Chap. 4. In: Dionne
EJ (ed) Handbook of Insurance. Kluwer, Dordrecht
Ehrlich I, Becker G (1972) Market insurance, self-insurance, and self-protection. J Polit Econ 80:623–648
Hirshleifer J, Riley J (1975) The analytics of uncertainty and information: an expository survey. J Econ Lit
17:1375–1421
Hoy M, Robson AJ (1981) Insurance as a Giffen good. Econ Lett 8:47–51
Footnote 12 continued
Case 1 Here the total insurance consumed in year n + 1 is nL(m). Here diminishing returns apply to each
year’s insurance savings individually so that every new year the country begins a new decreasing returns
process.
Case 2 Here the total insurance coverage consumed in year n + 1 is L(nm). Here m2-savings set aside
each year generate less marginal return than the same m savings of the year before.
In both I and II, greater m2 produces more diminishing returns, although in different manner and to different
degree. Note however, that with case II, diminishing returns, in addition to being greater for larger values
of m2, are more severe the rarer the emergency (higher value of n).
123
122 T. Ihori, M. C. McGuire
Ihori T (1994) Economic integration of countries with international public goods. J Jpn Int Econ 8(3):530–
550
Ihori T, McGuire MC (2006) Group provision against adversity: security by insurance versus protection,
mimeo
Ihori T, McGuire MC (2007) Collective risk control and group security: the unexpected consequences of
differential risk aversion. J Public Econ Theory 9:231–263
Ihori T, McGuire MC (2008a) National adversity: managing insurance and protection. Presented to a confer-
ence on “The causes and consequences of conflict,” Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Germany,
28–29 March 2008
Ihori T, McGuire MC (2008b) Alliance interactions in the provision of mutual insurance and mutual
protection: problems of collaboration when the collective good is security
McGuire MC, Pratt J, Zeckhauser R (1991) Paying to improve your chances: gambling or insurance? J Risk
Uncertain 4:329–338
McGuire MC (2000) Provision for adversity: managing supply uncertainty in an era of globalization.
J Conflict Resolut 44(6):730–752
McGuire MC (2006) Uncertainty, risk aversion, and optimal defense against interruptions in supply. Defense
Peace Econ 17(4):287–311
McGuire MC, Becker G (2006) Reversal of misfortune: paradox in optimization across contingencies,
UCLA Conference in Honor of Jack Hirshleifer, 11 March. Defence and Peace Economics, December
Mossin J (1968) Aspects of rational insurance purchasing. J Polit Econ 79:553–568
Schlesinger H (2000) The theory of insurance demand, Chap 5. In: Dionne EJ (ed) Handbook of insurance.
Kluwer, Dordrecht
123
